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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NA.TIONAL FINANCE COM-
p 1-\NY OF PROVO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent_, 
v. 
DALLAS E. DALEY and 
FLORA DALEY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
No. 
9618 
STATEMENT O:F THE NATURE OF THE 
CASE 
This is an action upon a judgment obtained by 
plaintiff in the Ogden City Court, wherein defendants 
have interposed the affirmative defense that the prior 
judgment is a proYable debt discharged in bankruptcy. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants moved the lower court for a judgment 
upon the pleadings. The lower court denied defendants' 
motion, and defendants have petitioned for intermediate 
appeal from said order denying the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. This Honorable Court has 
granted the petition for intermediate appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal as a matter of law of 
the order of the luwer court denying their motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
On May 29, 1958, defendants made a loan from 
plaintiff, a loan company, in the sum of $577.69, deliver-
ing a promissory note as evidence of the indebtedness. 
On January 7, 1959, a judgment was obtained by plain-
tiff, and against defendants, in the Ogden City Court, 
upon a complaint alleging a cause of action upon said 
note. 
Subsequently, on May 23, 1959, both defendants 
filed in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Utah, their voluntary petitions in bankruptcy, 
and were duly adjudicated bankrupts. The schedule 
of liabilities, filed with each petition, set forth the obli-
gation to the plaintiff, and notice was given in accord-
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ance with law. On Deeember 28, 1959, defendant Flora 
Daley was granted her discharge in bankruptcy, and 
on 1~-,ebruary 8, 1960, defendant Dallas E. Daley was 
granted his discharge in bankruptcy. 
Thereafter, on February 17, 1961, plaintiff filed 
the instant action upon its judgment obtained in the 
Ogden City Court. The cotnplaint is based solely upon 
the judgment, making no reference whatsoever to fraud 
or misrepresentation. Defendants answered denying 
the judgment, and setting up as an affirmative defense 
their discharge as bankrupts, avering that the judg· 
ments, in any event, would be a provable and discharge• 
able obligation by virtue of the Acts of Congress relat-· 
ing to bankruptcy. 
By way of a pleading entitled "Reply," plaintiff 
asserts that defendant borrowed money from the plain-
tiff, and that the san1e was obtained fraudulently. It 
is further asserted that the judgment, the gravamen of 
the present action, was based upon the promissory note 
given plaintiff at the time of the loan. 
Fraud was not the basis of the original action in the 
Ogden City Court, nor is it the basis of the instant 
complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED, AS A 
)lATTER OF LA\V, TO JUDGMENT ON THE 
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PLEADINGS, INASMUCH AS THE JUDG-
MENT FORMING THE BASIS OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT IS A DISCHARGE-
ABLE OBLIGATION BY VIRTUE OF THE 
BANKUPTCY ACT. 
A. PLAINTIFF IS PRECLUDED FROM 
INTRODUCING EVIDENCE OF 
FRAUD WHERE ACTION BASED ON 
PRIOR .JlJDGMENT, AND WHERE 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS DEVOID OF 
PROOF TO ESTABLISH THE NON-
DISCHARGEABLE CHARACTER OF 
TilE OBLIGATION. 
Section I7 of the Acts of Congress relating to 
bankruptcy, provides that a discharge in bankruptcy 
will release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, 
except such as "are liabilities for obtaining money or 
property by false pretenses or false representations, or 
for obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining 
an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a 
materially false state1nent in ·writing respecting his 
financial condition made or published or caused to be 
made or published in any manner whatsoever with in-
tent to deceive,***" (II U.S.C. § 36). The foregoing 
incorporates into the Act by amend1nent (Pub. L. No. 
86-62I, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July I2, I960), 7 4 Stat. 
408) the result previously reached by case law. Whether 
plaintiff can bring this doctrine to bear upon defend-
ants depends upon the genesis of the action. 
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This case znust not be confused with those where 
the plaintiff commences an action upon the promissory 
note, or even upon the alleged fraud, and proceeds in 
the trial of the matter, in the first instance to offer 
competent evidence of fraud. There is no allegation or 
evidence of fraud apparent in the first action which 
produced the judgment, nor do we have any allegation 
of fraud, nor can any properly be made, in the present 
action on the judgment. The original judgment, assum-
ing that the entire record of those proceedings can be 
inspected, shows that the action ·was brought by plain-
tiff upon a promissory note, and that judgment was 
taken upon the pron1issory note. Neither the action, 
proceedings, pleadings, proof or judgment make refer-
ence to any fraud or misrepresentation such as would 
establish the nondischargeable character of the obli-
gation. This fact is uncontroverted and must be in 
mind when the authorities are examined. 
It can be agreed that the transformation of a non-
dischargeable obligation into a note or judgment does 
not thereby render the obligation dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy, and it is agreed that the court may look through 
the new form of indebtedness and reveal its true charac-
ter, where that is the fact. Cases supporting this propo-
sition are distinguishable from the instant case in that 
only one step intervened between the original debt, 
claimed to be nondischargeable, and the effect of the 
discharge, that step being the giving of the note in 
satisfaction of the obligation, or the obtaining of a 
judgment to enforce the debt. 
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Two steps intervene in the instant case. We not 
only have a promissory note given by the defendants, 
but in addition we have a judgment on the note. Indeed, 
it can be stated that a third step is involved, as plaintiff 
is here endeavoring, not to enforce his judgment, but 
to bring a wholly new action on the former judgment. 
Even assuming that the court could look behind a judg-
ment, standing alone, or behind a note, standing alone, 
plaintiff asks that this court look behind the judgment 
and then behind the note. Whether the court can now 
examine evidence having no relation to the judgment 
and not properly raised by the pleadings in either 
action is the only issue presented here. . 
Although there is some sparse authority to the 
contrary, the overwhelming number of courts and re-
sponsible authorities have concluded that the nondis-
chargeable character of the original obligation may be 
shown only if the record of the judgment or the pro-
ceedings in which it was obtained discloses its nondis-
chargeability, but not otherwise. This view is supported 
by cases collected in an annotation at 170 A.L.R. 368, 
at 37 4, which summarizes the dominant view to conclude 
that the nondischargeable character of the original 
obligation may be shown only by what appears on the 
judgment record or the record of the proceedings cul-
minating in the judgment; so that, if nothing appears 
on the judgment record or the record of the proceedings 
which would establish the nondischargeability asserted 
by the plaintiff, then the judgn1ent will be discharged. 
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This rationale is supported by the most respected 
authority on bankruptcy, Collier, who observes in Collier 
iJankruptcy Manual, Second Edition, at page 208, as 
follows: 
"Of course, if the judgment is based on a rec-
ord which contains no evidence of false repre-
sentations, it should be dischargeable. (Citing 
cases.)" 
Fuller treatment of the problem in Collier on 
Bankruptcy~ 14th Edition, Vol. 1, p. 1623, deals with 
our precise Issue : 
"'Vhere, however, a liability has been prose-
cuted to judgment, the record is decisive as to 
the character of the claim upon which the judg-
ment is founded, and cannot be affected by the 
introduction of parol evidence except in the case 
of ambiguity. (Citing cases). In order that a 
judgment based upon a fraudulent representa-
tion may be excepted from the operation of a 
discharge, the record in the action must show 
fraud and deceit were the 'gist and gravamen' 
of the action. (Citing cases) ". 
Again, this generally accepted proposition govern-
ing the instant case finds support in 6 Am. Jur.~ Bank-
n.tptcy, § 816, page 1031, which makes the following 
conclusion: 
"It appears that the majority of the cases 
adopt the view that the nondischargeable charac-
ter of the original obligation may be shown not-
withstanding the recovery of a judgment on the 
note which evidenced the original obligation, by 
resort to the record of the judgment or of the 
proceedings in which it was obtained. By the 
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weight of authority, although it is permitted to 
go behind the judgment for the purpose of as-
certaining the character of the original obliga-
tion, the scope of the showing in this respect is 
restricted to the record of the judgment or of 
the proceedings in which it was obtained. If 
nothing appears on that record showing that the 
original obligation was of a character excepted 
from the discharge in bankruptcy, the judgment 
is dischargeable, and~ conversely, if that record 
discloses the nondischargeable character of the 
original obligation, the judgment will not be 
discharged." 
To the same effect, see also 8 C.J.S._, Bankruptcy_,§ 587, 
as follows: 
"Where the claim or demand against which a 
discharge in bankruptcy is asserted is in the form 
of a judgment and the issue involved is whether 
the judgment comes within a class excepted from 
the operation of the discharge, the entire record 
of the action in which such judgment was re-
covered is admissible and may be considered in 
the determination of the question, especially if 
the nature of the cause in which the judgment 
was obtained is not apparent from the judgment 
itself. Beyond such record the court may not go, 
evidence outside the record not being admissible, 
certainly not to contradict the record. This rule 
confining the evidence to the record is applicable 
where fraud in the incurrin,g of the indebtedness 
is asserted to sa·oe the judgment from the dis-
charge.n (Emphasis supplied.) 
At page 1522, in 8 C.J.S., it is observed: 
"Where it does not appear from the judgment 
itself just what the nature of the action was, 
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whether it was obtained in an action for fraud 
such as will bring it within the exception herein 
will be determined from an inspection of the 
entire record on which the judgment was based. 
Beyond the record, however, the court may not 
go; hence, where the judgment recites that the 
cause of action was based on an account, the 
judgment creditor cannot go beyond the judg-
ment and prove that the transaction out of which 
it arose was fraudulent, so as to avoid the effect 
of a discharge." 
The foregoing encyclopedic and text references 
are uniform in their analysis of the prevailing reasoning, 
and will not permit plaintiff, in the case at bar, to now 
open the litigation far beyond the original judgment, 
and even beyond the note itself. 
In a recent Ohio decision in proceedings to enforce 
a judgment taken on a promissory note, the record 
being silent as to the facts and circumstances under 
which the indebtedness was created, and a defense of 
bankruptcy being raised, it was held that evidence 
outside of the record is inadmissible to show that the 
judgment debtor's obligation is one that is excepted 
from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy 
(United Mercantile Agencies v. Williams, 87 Ohio 
App. 273, 94 N.E. 2d 572). The distinction between 
the situation where the proceedings leading to the judg-
ment are absolutely devoid of evidence tending to sho'v 
nondischargeability and the situation where the earlier 
proceedings do contain such evidence is well articulated 
in Rice v. Guider (1936) 27.5 Mich. 14, 265 N.W. 777, 
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and a subsequent Michigan decision, Citizens Mutual 
.Auto Ins. Co. v. Gardner (1946) 315 Mich. 689, 24 
N.W. 2d 410. In the Rice case, supra, the court ob-
served: 
"A judgment is but an adjudication upon a 
record. Plaintiff could go back of the judgment 
but not back of the record. The judgment record 
does not bring plaintiff's cause of action within 
any exception to the discharge in bankruptcy." 
The Insurance Company case, supra~ distinguished the 
Rice case in arriving at a different result upon the 
ground that the record of the proceedings leading to 
the judgment disclosed actual facts establishing the 
nondischargeable character of the debt. To the sarne 
effect, see Ohio Finance Co. v. Greene~ (Ohio, 1956), 
146 N.E. 2d 739; and, Jacobs v. Beatty~ 165 Ohio St. 
596, 138 N.E~ 2d 657. 
The facts in the present case are identical in all 
material respects to those in Bronx County Trust Co. 
v. Cassin (1939) 170 Misc. 962, 10 N.Y.S. 2d 986, 
where the court was asked to look beyond the pleadings 
and into the circumstances of the transaction to find 
grounds opposed to the discharge in bankruptcy. In 
refusing to do this, the court concluded upon grounds 
of practicability and the weight of authority that it 
should not attempt to determine whether the trans-
action involved a different claim from that of the cause 
of action which resulted in the judgment. 
And, in a case where the enforcement of a judg-
ment upon a note was sought against the bankrupt, 
10 
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and the complaint in that suit showed no allegation of 
fraud whatever, but that the cause of action was en-
tirely one for debt on the note, and the judgment so 
refiected, it was held that the bankrupt was entitled to 
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment, and the judg-
Inent creditor was precluded frmn offering extraneous 
evidence of fraud (Scott v. Corn (1929, Tex. Civ. 
App.) 19 S.W. 2~ 412, certiorari denied in 281 U.S. 
736, 74 L.ed. 1151, 50 S. Ct., 249). 
B. TO PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO INTRO-
D U C E EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE 
NOT RELATED TO THE PLEADINGS 
IN EITHER PROCEEDING WOULD 
DEFEAT TI-IE PURPOSE OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ACT AND CAUSE DE-
FENDANTS UNRE.i\SONABLE HAR-
ASSMENT. 
The rule has a sound social and legal basis. To 
pern1it creditors the dubious privilege of reopening 
their judgments against a bankrupt to offer extraneous 
and foreign evidence having no relationship or bearing 
to the cause of action, an election already made, would 
frustrate and defeat the purposes of the bankruptcy 
act. Carried to its logical extreme, the position urged 
by plaintiff conceivably could compel the bankrupt to 
relitigate and re-defend countless varieties of actions, 
all of which ordinarily are dischargeable. It is submitted 
that to do so is inconsistent with the orderly conduct 
of legal proceedings, and certainly is not consonant with 
11 
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the relief afforded by the Bankruptcy Act, which is 
intended to relieve the debtor from the constant worry 
and pressure of creditors. (See Re Rhutassel ( 1899, 
D.C.) 96 Fed. 597). 
Illuminating on this aspect of the problem is In 
Re Forgay (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah, 1956) 140 F. Supp. 
473, where the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, enjoined a judgment creditor from 
executing upon his judgment against a discharged 
bankrupt. In that case, a default judgment was obtained 
during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings 
upon a complaint alleging a promissory note, and an 
additional allegation of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Although fraud was averted, the court observed that 
the "action is founded upon the debtor,s note, and the 
creditor "took a judgment on the note, which included, 
interest and attorney fees as provided in the note." In 
granting a permanent injunction against the judgment 
creditor, who tried to set up the purported evidence 
of fraud in the securing of the loan, the court chided 
the loan company which "had personal notice of the 
bankruptcy proceedings but entered no appearance, 
filed on proof of claim and interposed no objections to 
discharge," concluding: 
"Misconduct on the part of creditors, if en-
couraged, portends the disintegration of the 
bankruptcy system and its orderly administra-
tion. There is no justification for federal courts 
to abdicate their authority in state courts, jeop-
ardize the usefulness of the Bankruptcy Act, 
12 
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pennit the confusion and harassment of the 
honest debtor, give advantage to the unscrupu-
lous creditor and contribute to the lack of public 
faith in the proceeding itself." 
ln affir1ning the Forgay decision, the lOth Circuit Court 
of r\.ppeals made the following observations: 
"We are dealing here with a finance company 
engaged in making small loans to debtors gen-
erally in distress when they apply for such loans. 
As observed by the Court in In re Caldwell, 
D. C., 33 F. Supp. 631, 635, 'If creditors, with 
their expert credit men, were as diligent in in-
vestigating the responsibility of applicants for 
credit and as prudent in bestowing it, as they are 
persistent and sometimes oppressive in attempt-
ing to collect after the indebtedness has been 
incurred, there would be fewer claims of fraud 
and atte1npts like this to defeat a discharge in 
bankruptcy,' and we might add by bypassing 
the bankruptcy court and in going into a non-
record state court" (240 F2d 18, 20). 
The court further stated that although a reference was 
made to fraud in the complaint, more was required, 
citing Fillmore Comrnercial & Savings Bank v. J(elly~ 
62 Utah 514, 220 Pac. 1064, 1066, for the following: 
" 'It is elementary that fraud must be alleged 
by distinctly pleading the facts constituting the 
fraud. Mere epithets or conclusions or general 
charges * * * are not good unless accompanied 
with a statement of facts to sustain it * * * . It 
is necessary to show not only what the fraud 
was, and that injury has been sustained, but also 
the connection of the fraud with the alleged 
13 
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damaged, so that it may appear * * * whether 
the one might have resulted directly from the 
other.' " · 
See also State Finance Co. v. Murrow (lOth Cir., 
1954), 216 F.2d 676; and In re Danahy~ D.C.N.Y., 45 
F. Supp. 758. 
In a Utah case treating with a similar aspect of 
dischargeability in bankruptcy, the court permitted an 
examination behind a divorce judgment to ascertain 
the nature of an award relating to alimony (Lyons v. 
Lyons (Utah, 1949), 206 P.2d 148. In the Lyons 
case it was apparent that the award was ambiguous and 
in need of clarification, which is not the situation in the 
instant case, as here there is no contention that fraud 
was the basis of either action. In the Lyons case the 
Utah Supreme Court cited as authority for its ruling 
2 Freeman on Judgments~ 5th Ed., 1176, and this 
author recognizes the distinction between our situations, 
where, at page 1177, he comments: 
"But while the form of the action is not con-
trolling in determining whether the case falls 
within the exception of the statute, nevertheless 
this fact must appear from. the record (citing 
Matter of Benoit, 124 App. Div. 142, 108 N.Y. 
Supp. 889.) and where the action is on contract 
it is not permissible to show the debt had its 
inception in fraud." 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
The result sought by defendants in their motion 
for judgment on the pleadings is manifestly fair and 
in har1nony with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. 
It cannot go unnoticed that plaintiff has never com-
plained about fraud until an answer is filed to a law 
suit commenced long after the bankruptcy cases are 
closed. No clai1n of fraud was made in the suit on the 
note; none was made in the bankruptcy proceeding; 
and, none was made in the instant complaint. To permit 
plaintiff to throw in a claim of fraud to support an 
action upon a note, and where the damages are bottomed 
on contract, would be to grossly distort the litigation 
beyond the sensible boundaries furnished by the plead-
ings, and compel the defendants to defend an action 
upon a theory neYer properly presented to the Ogden 
City Court or to the Second District Court. Accord-
ingly, the defendants respectfully ask that the action 
of the Second District Court denying their motion for 
judgment on the pleadings be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'i\TILLIAM G. FOWLER 
1101 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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